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Abstract:  A  new  quantum  key  distribution  protocol  is  proposed. The  suggested  protocol  has  two 
advantages. First: whenever an eavesdropper is present, the error rate increases obviously. Second, the 
eavesdropper can get only 2/n from the total information for an arbitrary n. Hence, eavesdropper has 
less information and can be detected easier.  Moreover, the new protocol effectiveness is discussed and 
shown to be essentially higher than those of the other known protocols. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  Quantum  key  distribution  (QKD)  enables  Secret 
Key  Establishment  between  two  users,  using  a 
combination  of  a  classical  channel  and  a  quantum 
channel.  QKD  is  based  on  laws  of  quantum  physics. 
More  precisely,  it  is  based  on  the  fact  that  an 
eavesdropper,  trying  to  intercept  the  quantum 
communication, will inevitably leave traces which can 
thus be detected. In this case, the QKD protocol aborts 
the  generation  of  the  key,  this  property  allows  to 
perform  Key  Establishment  with  an  extremely  high 
security  standard  which  is  known  as  unconditional 
security.   Experimental quantum key distribution was 
demonstrated  for  the  first  time  in  1989  (it  was 
published  only  in  1992)
[2,  5].  Since  then,  tremendous 
progress  has  been  made.  Today,  several  groups  have 
shown that quantum key distribution is possible, even 
outside the laboratory. For example, a team from BBN 
Technologies,  Boston  University,  and  Harvard 
University has recently built and begun to operate the 
Quantum  Key  Distribution  network  under  DARPA 
sponsorship.  Moreover,  many  Quantum  Key 
distribution  products  are  already  commercially 
available such as ID Quantique and MagiQ 
[7,  8,  9] . 
   In  this  paper,  a  novel  quantum  key  distribution  is 
proposed, which reduces an eavesdropper information 
for a given error rate.  For example if n=10, then the 
eavesdropper information is  about 20% and the error 
rate about 80%. The rest of this paper is arranged as 
follows:  Section  2  introduces  the  most  well  known 
quantum key distribution protocols, Section 3 describes 
the  new  quantum  key  distribution  protocol  and  its 
advantages, and Section 4 proves the correctness of the 
suggested protocol. 
 
QUANTUM KEY DISTRIBUTION  
 
   In 1984 Bennett and Brassard suggested the first key 
distribution  protocol  based  on  quantum  physics 
principles, and called BB84 after them
[1].  Since  then, 
many other protocols have been suggested to enhance 
BB84 security or to avoid some practical problems, for 
example SAGE04 is suggested to avoid photon-number 
splitting attack. 
   In BB84 protocol Alice and Bob use two channels, 
the first is a quantum channel which is used to send the 
qubits, while the second channel is used to announce 
the transforms that have been applied on the qubits, this 
channel is not assumed to be secure. At the begin of 
BB84 protocol, Alice sends Bob a random sequence of 
quantum qubits, which are equally likely to be in one of 
four possible states: 
 
|y1>=|0>, |y2>=|1>, |y3>= 2 / 1 |0>+ 2 / 1 |1> and 
|y4>= 2 / 1 |0>- 2 / 1  |1>. 
 
  Bob and Alice agree that the corresponding bit values 
of  the  previous  four  states  are  0,  1,  0,  and  1, 
respectively.  From  these  four  states  there  are  two 
possible  orthogonal  bases:  +  (or  rectilinear)  basis 
formed  from the |y1> and |y2> states and the × (or 
diagonal) basis formed from the |y3> and |y4> states. 
The BB84 protocol goes as follows: 
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1-  Alice randomly prepares m qubits, each in one of 
the four states |y1>,  |y2>, |y3> or |y4> and sends 
them to Bob over a quantum channel. 
2-  For  each  qubit  that  Bob  receives,  he  chooses  at 
random one of the two bases ({|y1>, |y2>} denoted 
by + or {|y3>, |y4>} denoted by ×  and measures 
the qubit with respect to that basis. (Equivalently, 
Bob  measures  the  qubit  randomly  with  respect  to 
the  standard  basis  or  performs  a  Hadamard 
transform on qubit and then measures it with respect 
to the standard basis). 
3-  Alice  announces  (over  a  classically  insecure 
channel) the sequence of the bases has used. 
4-  Bob  tells  Alice  at  which  times  he  measured  the 
correct bases. If he chooses the same basis as Alice, 
his measurement result is the same as the classical 
bit  that  Alice  prepared.  If  the  bases  differ,  Bob’s 
result is completely random. 
5-  Alice and Bob discard the times when they did not 
use the same bases. 
6-  Alice and Bob then test the security of their key by 
using a randomly chosen subset of their key. Results 
of  their  subset  are  compared  and  if  errors  are 
detected, the transmission is insecure and they abort 
and start again. 
7-  Classical error correction and privacy amplification 
techniques are used to generate a secure key. 
   An example of BB84 Protocol from Alice to Bob is 
given in Table 1. In perfect conditions Alice and Bob 
generate and share identical random keys, but because 
device imperfection and background noise can not be 
avoided, Alice and Bob can never guarantee that Eve 
has no information at all about their keys, for example, 
if Eve applies Intercept-resend attack on all the qubits, 
she gets 50% information, while Alice and Bob have 
about 25% of error in their sifted key. They can easily 
detect  the  presence  of  Eve.  If,  however,  Eve  applies 
Intercept-resend  attack  to  only  a  40%  of  the 
communication, then the error rate will be only 10% 
and Eve information will be about 20%. This error rate 
and the communication noise cannot be distinguished 
(experimental  studies  indicate  that  the  error  rate 
generated by the noise and the devices imperfection is 
about 10% see
[4,  5]) , and so to be on the safe side Alice 
and Bob have to assume that all errors are due to Eve. If 
the error rate is more than an agreed threshold, 10% 
let’s say, then they must regenerate the key, but if the 
error  rate  is  less  than  an  greed  threshold,  they  must 
perform error correction to remove the disagreement in 
their  keys  and  privacy  amplification  to  decrease  the 
amount of information held by Eve.  
   Another important protocol is SAGE04
[3, 6], which is 
proposed  to  avoid  photon-number-splitting  attack 
(PNS). This can be done by replacing step 3 in BB84 
protocol,  instead  of  announcing  the  sequence  of  the 
bases used, Alice announces publicly one of the four 
sets  {|y1>,  |y3>},  {|y2>,  |y3>},  {|y1>,  |y4>}  or 
{|y2>, |y4>}, that contains the state of the photon sent 
out  by  her.  In  this  case,  an  eavesdropper  can  not 
determine the bases that must be used. 
 
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
  
     The  proposed  protocol  has  a  fundamental, 
qualitatively  new  feature,  which  allows  secure  data 
transmission  through  practically  any  noisy  quantum 
channel.  Unlike  the  pervious  protocols,  the  new 
protocol allows to the sender and the receiver to apply 
arbitrary  number  of  a  unitary  operation  on  random 
states, which is not chosen in advance by either party. 
The suggested protocol goes as follows: 
1-  Alice randomly prepares m qubits, each in one of 
the two states: 
       |y1> = |0>  
    |y2> = |1> 
2-  For each qubit, Alice applies the unitary operator  
3-   
4-  R(f ) i times  on the state |yk>  where  
 
R(f )=
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -
f f
f f
cos sin
sin cos , iÎ{0,1….n-1} 
 
and  f = n / p . 
Thus the sent qubit is |y> =R(f )
i |yk>  where k=1 
or 2 and iÎ{1,2,…n-1} . 
5-  Bob applies the unitary operator R(f ) j times on the 
received states, jÎ{0,1….n}, and then measures it 
with respect to the standard basis. 
6-  Alice announces publicly the number of times she 
applies the operator R(f ) on each qubit, thus she 
announces a sequence of integer numbers. 
7-  Bob tells Alice to discard the times when the output 
of the measurement is confusing, in this protocol the 
output is confusing if (i+j) mod n ￿ 0 or (i+j) mod 
n￿ n/2.  
8-  Alice and Bob then test the security of their key by 
using a randomly chosen subset of their key. Results 
of  their  subset  are  compared  and  if  errors  are 
detected, the transmission is insecure and they abort 
and start again. 
9-  Classical error correction and privacy amplification 
techniques are used to generate a secure key. 
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Table 1:  An example of BB84 Protocol from Alice to Bob 
The Bit   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
Alice’s Random Bits  1  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  1 
Alice’s Random Basis  ×  +  ×  ×  +  +  ×  ×  ×  +  +  ×  ×  ×  + 
Alice’s States  y4  y1  y3  y4  y2  y2  y3  y4  y3  y1  y1  y4  y4  y3  y2 
Bob’s  Random Basis  ×  +  +  ×  ×  +  ×  +  ×  +  ×  ×  ×  +  + 
Bob’s Result  1  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1 
Same Basis?  Y  Y    Y    Y  Y    Y  Y    Y  Y    Y 
The sifted Key   1  0    1    1  0    0  0    1  1    1 
 
Table 2: The Proposed Protocol from Alice to Bob where n=10 
The Bit   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
Alice’s Random Bits 
 
1  0  0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  0  1 
Alice’s Random integer 
iÎ{0,1...n-1} 
3  9  8  2  5  0  1  7  4  5  9  8  6  0  4 
Bob’s  Random integer 
jÎ{0,1….n-1} 
4  6  5  8  1  3  9  8  5  2  0  7  4  7  2 
Bob’s Result 
 
0  1  1  1  0  1  0  0  0  1  0  0  1  1  0 
Is  (i+j)mod 10 = 0  
or (i+j)mod 10 =5  
  Y    Y      Y          Y  Y     
The sifted Key     0    1      0          1  1     
 
An  example  of  the  Proposed  Protocol  from  Alice  to 
Bob is given in Table 2. In this protocol, Eve can get 
only 2/n information, while Alice and Bob have about 
(n-2)/n of error in their sifted key. For example if n=10, 
then Eve information is about 20%, which means that, 
Eve information is reduced about 60% (in comparison 
with BB84). Moreover, Alice and Bob have about 80% 
of error in their sifted key, which means that the error 
rate  is  increased    about  70%  (in  comparison  with 
BB84).  For estimation of the Eve’s intervention into 
the  data  transmission  through  a  quantum  channel  we 
apply  a  unitary  operator  on  random  states,  which 
adequately  reflects  the  information  aspect  of  the 
eavesdropping  and  can  be  effectively  used  for  both 
constructing  and  analyzing  the  quantum  key 
distribution protocol. 
 
CORRECTNESS OF THE PROPOSED 
PROTOCOL 
 
It is easy to prove that (by using induction): 
 
R(f )
x
=
x
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -
f f
f f
cos sin
sin cos =
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -
f f
f f
x x
x x
cos sin
sin cos
 
x  is  an  integer  number  greater  than  zero.  Now  Let  
f = n / p  then 
R( n / p )
i+j
=
j i
n n
n n
+
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -
/ cos / sin
/ sin / cos
p p
p p
 
=
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+ +
+ - +
n j i n j i
n j i n j i
/ ) cos( / ) sin(
/ ) sin( / ) cos(
p p
p p
 
 
   In case  (i+j) mod n=0 , then (i+j) =kn and  
 
R( n / p )
i+j = ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ -
p p
p p
k k
k k
cos sin
sin cos
 
= ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
±
±
1 0
0 1
. 
 
   The sign  ± depends on k whether it is odd or even. In 
this case, if the original state is |yk>  then Bob state is  
±  |yk>  and  his  measurement  equals  to  the 
corresponding Alice bit. 
 
   In case  (i+j) mod n=n/2 and n is an even integer, 
then (i+j) =kn+n/2 and  
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R( n / p )
i+j
  
= ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
+ +
+ - +
) 2 / cos( ) 2 / sin(
) 2 / sin( ) 2 / cos(
p p p p
p p p p
k k
k k
 
= ￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
±
±
0 1
1 0
. 
 
   The sign  (±) depends on k whether it is odd or even, 
In this case, if the original state is |0> then Bob state is     
± |1> and if the original state is |1> then Bob state is     
± |0>, hence, Bob measurement is the opposite of  the 
corresponding  Alice bit, and therefore bob can  guess 
Alice’s original bit. 
   In case (i+j) mod n ￿ 0 or (i+j) mod n ￿ n/2, Bob 
cannot determine the original state whether |0>  or |1> 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
   It is shown that the proposed protocol surpasses all 
known quantum key distribution protocols by a number 
of  criteria.  For  instance,  the  eavesdropper  has  less 
information and can be detected easier. This means that 
the  new protocol can basically  work at high level of 
external errors or eavesdropping attacks, which is a new 
feature of the quantum key distribution protocols. 
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